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Criminal Law
By LIDA K. WEST*
INTRODUCTION
Criminal law continues to be one of the most dynamic areas
of the law. The Kentucky appellate courts published opinions
during the survey period' explicating various offenses including
bribing a witness, burglary, and criminal attempt. The courts
also elaborated on defenses and sentencing options contained
within the Kentucky Penal Code. Finally, the interpretation of
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) section 532.080,2 Kentucky's
persistent felony offender (PFO) provision, remained a focal
point of decisional law. 3 This Survey discusses and analyzes a
number of these cases, which were selected for their importance
to the practicing criminal lawyer.
I. OFFENSES
A. Bribing a Witness
In Penn v. Commonwealth,4 the Kentucky Supreme Court
held that proof of a pending "official proceeding" is not re-
quired to sustain a conviction of bribing a witness under KRS
section 524.020.1
A person is guilty of bribing a witness when he "offers,
confers, or agrees to confer any pecuniary benefit upon a witness
* Assistant Public Advocate, Kentucky Office For Public Advocacy, Frankfort,
Kentucky. B.A. 1971, J.D. 1976, University of Kentucky.
The analysis and conclusions contained in this Article are solely those of the
author and do not necessarily represent any position of the Kentucky Office of Public
Advocacy.
The survey period ran from July, 1984 to July, 1985.
2 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (Bobbs-Merrill 1985) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
See Read, Kentucky Law Survey-Criminal Law, 72 KY. L.J. 365 (1983-84).
4 687 S.W.2d 135 (Ky. 1985).
KRS § 524.020 (Bobbs-Merrill 1985).
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or a person he believes may be called as a witness in any official
proceeding with intent to ... influence the testimony of that
person .... ",6 The defendant in Penn argued that he could not
be convicted of bribing a witness under the statute because,
when Penn offered his neighbor $10,000 not to tell anyone about
the marijuana patch on his property, no "official proceeding"
was underway. 7
The Court based its rejection of Penn's argument on the
statute's language, which prohibits bribes offered by a defendant
to a witness "or a person he believes may be called as a witness
.... ,' The Court held that "[t]he inclusion in this statute of
the above ... language broadens the scope of the statute to
include the bribe offered under the facts of this case." 9 After
Penn, a defendant violates the statute by offering a bribe with
intent to influence the testimony of a potential witness at any
potential official proceeding.
The Court's holding may support eccentric applications of
the statute, some of which were noted by Justice Leibson in his
dissenting opinion.' 0 KRS section 524.010(4) broadly defines "of-
ficial proceeding" as "a proceeding heard before any legislative,
judicial, administrative or other governmental agency or official
authorized to hear evidence under oath . . . ."" This definition
clearly encompasses civil proceedings.' 2 Consequently, following
Penn an individual could be charged with the criminal offense
of bribing a witness if he offered a benefit to someone in
6 Id.
7 687 S.W.2d at 136.
Id. at 137.
'Id.
, Justice Liebson maintained that, as a result of the Penn holding, this penal
statute could be applied in several "innocuous" situations from which liability could
later arise: "business secrets that could wind up in a contract action, corporate secrets
that could wind up in a shareholder's action, or even a personal matter that could wind
up before an administrative agency." Id. at 138 (Liebson, J., dissenting).
He also argued that the Court must strictly construe the statute and that its
extensive interpretation of the statutory language violated the intent of the legislature.
Id. at 137. He pointed out that the only prior Kentucky case on bribery, Commonwealth
v. Bailey, 82 S.W. 299 (Ky. 1904), required that the bribed party actually be a witness
in an "ongoing proceeding." Id. at 138.
KRS § 524.010(4) (1985).
I d.
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exchange for not divulging a matter that would subject him to
civil liability. The Court's construction of the statute also pre-
cludes a consistent interpretation of the same language contained
in KRS section 524.030, which prohibits "bribe receiving by a
witness."' 3 Like KRS section 524.020, KRS section 524.030 ex-
tends to "a person believing he may be called as a witness in
any official proceeding.' ' 4 The language in both statutes is
substantially identical. Nevertheless, an interpretation of the
language in KRS section 524.030 that is consistent with the
Court's interpretation of the same language in KRS section
524.020 would lead to an anomalous result: a potential witness
in a potential criminal or civil proceeding who accepts a bribe
not to divulge information may be convicted of bribe receiving
even though he was never legally required to divulge the infor-
mation. It is unclear whether the Penn Court would equate the
above situations to the defendant's conduct in Penn, which the
Court characterized as "corrupt interference with the judicial
process and the proper administration of justice.' ' 6
B. Second Degree Burglary and Criminal Trespass
The Court also delineated during the survey period those
circumstances in which an instruction on criminal trespass must
be given. In Commonwealth v. Sanders,7 the defendant was
seen fleeing from a burglarized home from which items of prop-
erty were found missing. 8 The defendant asserted an alibi de-
" KRS § 524.030 (1985) provides:
(1) A witness or a person believing he may be called as a witness in any
official proceeding is guilty of bribe receiving by a witness when he solicits,
accepts or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit upon an agreement or
understanding that:
(a) His testimony will thereby be influenced; or
(b) He will attempt to avoid legal process summoning him to testify;
or
(c) He will attempt to absent himself from an official proceeding to
which he has been legally summoned.
(2) Bribe receiving by a witness is a Class D felony.
KRS § 524.030 (1985).
' Compare note 6 supra and accompanying text with note 13 supra.
' 687 S.W.2d at 137.
" 685 S.W.2d 557 (Ky. 1985).
Id. at 558.
1985-861
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fense.' 9 The court of appeals reversed the defendant's second
degree burglary conviction because the trial court failed to in-
struct the jury on criminal trespass. 20 Criminal trespass differs
from second degree burglary only in that second degree burglary
has the added element of "with intent to commit a crime.' '21
In reversing the court of appeals, the Kentucky Supreme
Court noted that a different court of appeals panel had previ-
ously held, in Polk v. Commonwealth,22 on "markedly similar"
facts, that the defendant was not entitled to a criminal trespass
instruction. The Supreme Court concluded that Polk was the
sounder decision .2  The Court contrasted Polk with its own
decision in Martin v. Commonwealth,24 an appeal of a second
degree burglary conviction in which the Court held that an
instruction on criminal trespass should have been given.25 In
contrast to Sanders, the Martin defendants admitted entering the
dwelling but testified that they were so intoxicated they could
not have formed a culpable intent. 26
The Sanders Court observed, "We are not saying that in
some circumstances a criminal trespass instruction would not be
required even when the defense is alibi."27 The Court ultimately
announced the rule that a showing of unlawful entry "permits
the jury to infer intent to commit a crime in the absence of
,9 Id.
20 Ky. L. SuMm. 5, at 3 (Ky. Ct. App. April 6, 1984) [hereinafter cited as KLS].
22 The offense of second degree burglary is defined in KRS § 511.030 (1985): "(1)
A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when, with the intent to commit a
crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling. (2) Burglary in the
second degree is a Class C felony." First degree criminal trespass is defined in KRS §
511.060: "(1) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree when he knowingly
enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling. (2) Criminal trespass in the first degree is a
class A misdemeanor." The 1975 commentary to KRS § 511.060 explains that "[tihe
distinguishing factor is the element of 'intent to commit a crime,' which serves to convert
trespass into burglary."
12 574 S.W.2d 335 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
685 S.W.2d at 559.
2 571 S.W.2d 613 (Ky. 1978).
685 S.W.2d at 559.
26 571 S.W.2d at 614.
2, 685 S.W.2d at 559. See Pace v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 664, 667 (Ky.
1978) ("No matter what technical defense is asserted by an accused at trial, the jury is
always free to disbelieve such evidence as relates to this defense and to believe instead
any remaining evidence from which an exoneration of the crime might be inferred.").
[Vol. 74
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other facts which would justify the lesser degree instruction. '28
C. Possession of Stolen Property as Prima Facie Evidence
of Burglary
In Jackson v. Commonwealth,29 the Kentucky Supreme Court
considered the sufficiency of evidence that resulted in a burglary
conviction.30 Jackson was convicted of burglary based on his
possession of property stolen in the burglary.3' On appeal, Jack-
son conceded that the evidence established his knowledge that
the property was stolen,32 but argued that the mere possession
of stolen property does not create a prima facie case of bur-
glary.33 The Court disagreed and, in support of its opinion,
analogized to case law defining prima facie evidence of theft:
The possession of stolen property is prima facie evidence of
guilt of theft of the property. Wheeler v. Commonwealth....
173 S.W.2d 817 ([Ky.] 1943); Martin v. Commonwealth, ...
276 S.W.2d 19 ([Ky.] 1955). Where there is a breaking and
entering and property taken from a dwelling and the property
is found in possession of the accused, such showing makes a
submissible case for the jury on a charge of burglary. Wahl v.
Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 769 ([Ky.] 1972). Because the
evidence is sufficient to support a conviction that appellant
stole the property which was taken in a break-in, it follows
that the evidence supports a jury finding that said appellant
committed the burglary in which the property was stolen. 34
The Court's holding states a per se rule rather than a "to-
tality of the circumstances" rule. The Court cited Wahl v. Com-
monwealth,35 however, which held that "the case should be
submitted to the jury unless the defendant is able to produce
685 S.W.2d at 559.
670 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1984).
SId. at 829.
I d.
', Jackson told a police officer to whom he sold the property that it was "hot."
Id. at 830.
" Jackson argued that allowing mere possession of stolen goods to create a prima
facie burglary case had been declared unconstitutional. Id.
'1 Id.
11 490 S.W.2d 769 (Ky. 1972).
1985-86]
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evidence substantiating his innocence so conclusively that he has
overcome the presumption of guilt as a matter of law.' 3 6 Other
jurisdictions have held, in more precise terms, that the mere
possession of stolen goods does not create a submissible case of
burglary where the defendant offers a reasonable and unrefuted
explanation of the possession. 37
The Jackson holding also fails to weigh other important
factors. Although the Jackson Court notes in passing that Jack-
son told police officers that the property in his possession was
"hot," the Court accords this direct evidence of guilt no signif-
icance in its analysis. 3 The Court similarly recounts, without
weighing, evidence that Jackson knew from where at least some
of the property was stolen.39 Jackson also fails to recognize the
recent nature of the burglary as a factor in determining whether
a jury issue is presented. 40 It thus appears that the rule an-
nounced in Jackson, that the possession of property stolen in a
burglary is sufficient evidence of guilt, is broader than was
necessary to dispose of the sufficiency issue before the Court.
D. Perjury and False Swearing
In Commonwealth v. Thurman,4' the Kentucky Supreme
Court construed the materiality element in perjury. Reversing a
court of appeals decision, 42the Supreme Court held that Thur-
36 Id. at 771 (emphasis added).
11 Wood v. State, 248 S.E.2d 337 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (conviction based solely
upon circumstantial evidence overturned because evidence did not exclude all other
"reasonable inferences"); State v. Bergeron, 371 So. 2d 1309 (La. 1979) (insufficient
evidence presented to connect the defendant with breaking into home even though stolen
goods found in his possession); McLemore v. State, 638 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Crim. App.
1982) (appellant's statement that he had "borrowed" the stolen car was adequate defense
without rebuttal evidence from state). See also People v. Phoenix, 421 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1981). In Phoenix the Illinois Court of Appeals went a step beyond a rule
allowing for a case-by-case determination by holding that "the exclusive and unexplained
possession of recently stolen property, standing alone and without corroborating evidence
of guilt, does not prove burglary beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 1025.
' See 670 S.W.2d at 830-31.
Jackson told an undercover agent that some of the property came from a house
"down the road." Id. at 830.
40 See id.
11 691 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1985).
42 31 KLS 6, at 8 (Ky. Ct. App. May 4, 1984).
[Vol. 74
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man could be convicted of perjury rather than false swearing. 4a
A conviction of perjury requires that the false statements be
"material"," while a conviction of false swearing does not.4 1
Thurman testified, at both his preliminary hearing and trial,
that the prosecuting witness gave him a stolen ring. Thurman's
testimony at the two proceedings was inconsistent, however. At
the preliminary hearing Thurman testified that the witness was
a prostitute working for him who gave him the ring in payment
of a debt. At trial Thurman disavowed this prior testimony and
testified instead that the witness gave him the ring for money to
buy marijuana. 46
The perjury charge against Thurman stemmed from the in-
consistency between the two statements. The prosecution pro-
ceeded under KRS section 523.050(1), which provides: "In such
case it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to prove which
statement was false but only that one or the other was false and
not believed by the defendant to be true." 47
Thurman acknowledged the inconsistency between his two
statements, but contended that since the inconsistency did not
reach the issue of whether the ring was given to him or stolen
by him it was not material .4 The Court rejected this argument:
"It is not necessary that testimony, to be material, must relate
to the principal issue in a case. It is sufficiently material if it
has the potential to influence a tribunal or a jury."' 49 The Court
explained that Thurman's testimony was material in that it sought
to discredit the prosecuting witness and thus influence the jury
to believe Thurman's testimony and reject hers.5 0 The Court's
holding clarifies that statements material to the issue of a ma-
terial witness' credibility are also material for charging perjury.
"' 691 S.W.2d at 216.
KRS § 523.020 (1985) provides: "(1) A person is guilty of perjury in the first
degree when he makes a material false statement, which he does not believe, in any
official proceeding under oath required or authorized by law."
4 KRS § 523.040 (1985) provides: "(1) A person is guilty of false swearing when
he makes a false statement which he does not believe under oath required or authorized
by law."
691 S.W.2d at 215.
KRS § 523.050(1) (1985).
691 S.W.2d at 215.
I /d.
Id. at 215-16.
1985-861
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
E. Criminal Attempt
In Commonwealth v. Prather," the Kentucky Supreme Court
considered what conduct constitutes a "substantial step" under
KRS section 506.010, the criminal attempt statute. The statute
provides that:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal attempt to commit a crime
when, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required
for commission of the crime, he:
(b) Intentionally does or omits to do anything which,
under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is a
substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culmi-
nate in his commission of the crime.
(2) Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step
under subsection (1)(b) unless it is an act or omission which
leaves no reasonable doubt as to the defendant's intention to
commit the crime which he is charged with attempting. 52
In January 1983, Prather contacted John Henon, a police
informant, about Henon joining him in robbing the Executive
Inn in Owensboro, Kentucky. Henon contacted a Louisville po-
lice officer who instructed Henon to keep him advised of further
plans. Prather had obtained plans of the Executive Inn and
learned the times and methods of making the Inn's deposits.
After a "dry run" in which Henon and Prather went to Ow-
ensboro and followed the Inn's van to the bank, state police
officers set up surveillance at the Inn and two officers replaced
the Inn's regular couriers.5 3
Prather and Henon returned to Owensboro on the planned
day of the robbery. Prather, who carried a shotgun, tried the
doors of the company van to make sure they would open. When
the "couriers" left the Executive Inn's parking area, Henon and
Prather followed in Henon's car. The police closed in on Henon
and Prather when the van stopped at a traffic light.54
5- 690 S.W.2d 396 (Ky. 1985).
52 KRS § 506.010 (1985).
11 690 S.W.2d at 396.
14 Id. at 397.
[Vol. 74
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In determining whether Prather's conduct amounted to a
"substantial step" the Court adopted the standard articulated in
State v. Woods, 5 an Ohio case that held that a substantial step
requires overt acts "... . which convincingly demonstrate a firm
purpose to commit a crime .... ,,"6 The Court explained that:
"There is no absolute applicable to this statute except to say
that the overt acts, the substantial step, must be considered under
all of the circumstances of the case to discover whether they
manifest a clear intent to commit the crime. ' 57 Applying this
standard to Prather's conduct, the Court held that Prather's
arming himself, going to the scene of the proposed robbery,
testing the doors of the van, and following the van from the
parking lot constituted the required substantial step toward com-
mission of the crime.5 8
II. DEFENSES
A. Kidnapping Exemption
In Damron v. Commonwealth,59 the defendant argued that
the kidnapping exemption statute6w barred his kidnapping con-
viction. On the day after his escape from the Cadwell County
Jail, Damron entered a church, tied up a church pianist, took
her car keys, and fled in her car.6' At his trial, the jury was
-5 357 N.E.2d 1059 (Ohio 1976) (armed defendant's act of lying in wait for his
victim constitutes criminal attempt of robbery), vacated, 438 U.S. 910 (1978) (judgment
vacated only insofar as it left the death penalty imposed undisturbed).
: 690 S.W.2d at 397 (quoting State v. Woods, 357 N.E.2d at 1063). The court
also cited with approval State v. Workman, 584 P.2d 382 (Wash. 1978) and State v.
Pearson, 680 P.2d 406 (Utah 1984). 690 S.W.2d at 397. The Workman court adopted
the MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) definition of "substantial step": conduct "strongly
corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose." 584 P.2d at 387. The Model Penal Code
standard differs from that contained in KRS § 506.010(2), which requires that a sub-
stantial step "leave no reasonable doubt as to the defendant's intention to commit the
crime which he is charged with attempting."
In Pearson, the defendants were stopped by the police immediately following the
collection of materials required for a proposed robbery. 680 P.2d at 407. In upholding
the criminal attempt convictions, the court endorsed an analysis that "emphasizes what
the accused has done, not what remains to be done." Id. at 408.
57 690 S.W.2d at 397.
Id. at 398.
687 S.W.2d 138 (Ky. 1985).
KRS § 509.050 (1985).
6' 687 S.W.2d at 139-40.
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instructed that it could convict Damron of kidnapping the pianist
if the jurors believed that he restrained her to further his theft
of the car and his escape. 62
On appeal Damron argued that if the restraint of the pianist
was to further the theft of her car, then KRS section 509.050,
the "Kidnapping Exemption" statute, foreclosed his kidnapping
conviction. The statute provides:
A person may not be convicted of ... kidnapping when
his criminal purpose is" the commission of an offense defined
outside this chapter and his interference with the victim's lib-
erty occurs immediately with and incidental to the commission
of that offense, unless the interference exceeds that which is
ordinarily incident to commission of the offense which is the
objective of his criminal purpose. 6
The Kentucky Supreme Court held that "Damron's argument
that 'she [the pianist] was being restrained merely to allow the
theft to go smoothly without interference' does not take this
case out of the operation of the statute."6 4 Yet the Court gave
little guidance as to how it determined that the restraint of the
pianist exceeded "that which is ordinarily incident to commission
of the offense.''65 The Court also rejected the argument posed
by Damron that his restraint of the pianist was not intended to
further his escape,66 since the escape was fully accomplished the
day before the encounter with the pianist.67 The Court again
stated its conclusion without discussion: "Without getting into
62 Id. at 140.
6 KRS § 509.050 (1985).
14 687 S.W.2d at 140. The statute that continued to control the case was KRS §
509.040 (1985), which provides:
(1) A person is guilty of kidnapping when he unlawfully restrains another
person and when his intent is:
(b) To accomplish or advance the commission of a felony.
The Court held that the statute controlled the outcome of the issue regardless of
Damron's arguments about the degree of restraint used upon the pianist. 687 S.W.2d at
140.
63 KRS § 509.050 (1985).
' 687 S.W.2d at 140. KRS § 509.050 contains an exception to the exemption
provision for "a charge of kidnapping that arises from an interference with another's
liberty that occurs incidental to the commission of a criminal escape."
67 687 S.W.2d at 140.
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a hair-splitting thesis on when the escape is completed, we hold
that a jury issue of the matter was made out here, and there is
evidence to sustain the kidnapping conviction under the facts of
this case." 6
At a minimum Damron seems to indicate that the kidnapping
exemption statute will not benefit a defendant whose victim is
restrained past the time of the defendant's departure from the
scene. Justice Liebson dissented.69
B. Claim of "Reckless" Self-Protection Disallowed
In Baker v. Commonwealth,7" the Kentucky Supreme Court
partially overruled Blake v. Commonwealth.7' The Court held
in Blake that a jury could find that a defendant had acted in
self-defense and yet convict him of second degree manslaughter
or reckless homicide because the defendant was wanton or reck-
less in believing that deadly force was necessary.7 2 Thus, in a
situation presenting a factual issue as to the reasonableness of
the defendant's use of force, the defendant would, under Blake,
be entitled to instructions on homicide offenses having wanton-
ness or recklessness as an element.73
In Baker the Court found the reasoning of Blake to be
"erroneous" to the extent that it applied to reckless homicide. 74
The Court observed that KRS section 501.02075 defines reckless-
ness as "the failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable
6 Id.
69 Justice Liebson argued that KRS § 509.050 clearly exempted the restraint of the
pianist from the kidnapping statute. He stated that the force applied and the extent of
the restraint were no more than necessary to steal her car. He also thought that the
"escape" had concluded after the first day so that the exception would not apply. Id.
at 141 (Liebson, J., dissenting).
" 677 S.W.2d 876 (Ky. 1984).
" 607 S.W.2d 422 (Ky. 1980).
7 The Blake Court based its holding in part on KRS § 503.120(1) (1985), which
provides that the defense of self-protection "is unavailable in a prosecution for an
offense for which wantonness or recklessness ... suffices to establish culpability." 607
S.W.2d at 423.
11 607 S.W.2d at 424.
7, 677 S.W.2d at 879.
,5 KRS § 501.020 (1985).
1985-86]
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risk that a particular result will occur. ' 76 From this definition
the Court concluded that an instruction on reckless homicide is
warranted only when "the perpetrator of the homicide is una-
ware that his conduct entails a substantial and unjustifiable risk
of death. ' 77
The facts in Baker showed that the defendant shot the victim
because he believed she was about to shoot him. Since the
defendant could not logically contend that he did not perceive
the risk of death to the victim, it followed from the Court's
reasoning that he was not entitled to an instruction on recdess
homicide.7 8 Stated otherwise, it was logically impossible for Baker
to form a "reckless" belief that he must use force in his own
protection. "The general assembly did not provide ... for the
inclusion of an intentional offense within the definition of reck-
less homicide. ' 79
III. PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER STATUTE
A. Inferential Proof of Age Insufficient
In Hon v. Commonwealth,0 the Kentucky Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether, in a persistent felony offender
prosecution, the Commonwealth must affirmatively prove that
the defendant was at least eighteen years old when he committed
the prior felonies. Under KRS section 532.080(2)(b) the Com-
monwealth is required to show that the accused was eighteen or
older when he committed any prior felonies.8"
76 677 S.W.2d at 879 (quoting KRS § 501.020) (emphasis added). The court
distinguished recklessness from the two other mental states for culpability defined in
KRS § 501.020-intent and wantonness. Id. at 878. The court noted that this statutory
definition of recklessness, and not the "ordinary meaning of the word," applied to all
criminal statutes. Id. at 879.
" Id.
78 Id.
71 Id. The Court explained that "[wle cannot escape the fact that an act claimed
to be done in self-defense is an intentional act. It is not a 'reckless' act as the term is
defined in the statute." Id.
670 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1984).
81 KRS § 532.080(2)(b) (Bobbs-Merrill 1985) states:
(2) A persistent felony offender in the second-degree is a person who is
more than twenty-one (21) years of age and who stands convicted of a
felony after having been convicted of one (1) previous felony. As used in
[Vol. 74
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The Commonwealth argued that the date of conviction of
the prior felony supported an inference that the defendant was
eighteen at the time of its commission since it was "unlikely"
that any court would have waited four years to try him.8 2 The
Commonwealth cited as authority Kendricks v. Common-
wealth,83 where similar evidence was held sufficient to infer that
the defendant was the requisite ageA4 The Kentucky Supreme
Court rejected this argument. "Because the persistent felony
offender statute is so clear in its requirements, and so strictly
penal in nature, we believe that it is improper for proof of an
inferential nature to be used to obtain and sentence a conviction
under its terms." ' Thus, Hon's conviction was reversed on
grounds of insufficient evidence because the Commonwealth
introduced no direct proof of the age at which he committed
the prior felony. 6
The Hon Court's decision overruled Kendricks,1 and was
consistent with the Court's holdings and reasoning in previous
cases: the PFO statute is penal in nature, 8 the charge is easily
proven,8 9 and a defendant to a first degree PFO charge is not
this provision, a previous felony conviction is a conviction of a felony in
this state or conviction of a crime in any other jurisdiction provided:
b)" That the offender was over the age of eighteen (18) years at the
time the offense was committed ....
670 S.W.2d at 852.
557 SoW.2d 417 (Ky. 1977).
670 S.W,2d at 852. In Kendricks, no direct evidence of defendant's age was
offered, Nevertheless, the Court specifically held that since the defendant was twenty-
four years old at the time of his conviction for his first felony, it was reasonable to
infer that he was at least eighteen at the time of the commission of the felony. 557
S.W.2d at 420. The Court thought "it is unlikely that any court would wait six years
to try a person charged with a criminal offense." Id.
11 670 S.W,2d at 853 (emphasis in original).
6 AId.
Id.
Hardin v. Commonwealth, 573 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Ky. 1978). "KRS 532.080 does
not create or define a criminal offense. It recognizes a status and, in a proceeding
separate and apart from the initial trial, fixes a penalty which is to be imposed rather
than the one fixed by the jury on the initial trial" Id.
1 Pace v. Commonwealth, 636 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Ky. 1982) ("In order to establish
a persistent felony offender status, the Commonwealth merely needs to establish a simple
check list of technical statutory requirements."). It should be noted that proof of PFO
status is, in virtually every case, readily available from public records.
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automatically entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser offense
of second degree PFO.90
B. Two or More Previous Felony Convictions
KRS section 532.080(4) provides that:
For the purpose of determining whether a person has two
(2) or more previous felony convictions, two (2) or more
convictions of crime for which that person served concurrent
or uninterrupted consecutive terms of imprisonment shall be
deemed to be only one conviction, unless one (1) of the con-
victions was for an offense committed while that person was
imprisoned. 9'
In Zachery v. Commonwealth,92 the Kentucky Supreme Court
construed this portion of the PFO statute as indicating that a
probated sentence merges into a later sentence of imprisonment
to form one conviction. Nevertheless, the Court overruled Zach-
ery in Commonwealth v. Hinton.93
The holding of Zachery was based on the commentary to
KRS section 532.080(4), which states: "When an individual has
been convicted two times before serving any time in prison, his
convictions shall be considered a single conviction for purposes
of this section." 94 In 1976, however, the statute was amended
to include within the definition of a prior felony those convic-
tions resulting in probation, parole, or conditional release. 95 The
Supreme Court held in Hinton that this amendment effectively
nullified the portion of the commentary on which the decision
in Zachery was based. 96 "While the Commentary is a source of
10 Payne v. Commonwealth, 656 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Ky. 1983) ("The fact that two
convictions must be proven does not justify breaking down the charge into two parts so
as to give the jury the opportunity to pass on each prior conviction in the absence of
some evidence bringing one or both prior convictions into dispute.").
91 KRS § 532.080(4) (1985).
580 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. 1979).
91 678 S.W.2d 388 (Ky. 1984).
KRS § 532.080 commentary (1974).
95 KRS § 532.080(2), (3). The statute now includes situations where the defendant
is "on probation, parole, conditional discharge, conditional release, furlough, appeal
bond, or any other form of legal release from any of the previous felony convictions at
the time of commission of the felony for which he now stands convicted." Id.
678 S.W.2d at 390.
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interpretation for the original Act, once there is an amendment
the portion of the Commentary on that subject loses its valid-
ity.,197
The Court's construction of KRS section 532.080(4) harmo-
nizes that subsection with the amendments to subsections (2)
and (3) by consistently treating a probated sentence as a term
of imprisonment. 98 Thus, in the absence of a provision in the
PFO statute specifically merging a conviction for which a pro-
bated sentence is imposed with another conviction, such a con-
viction will be treated as though it resulted in a sentence of
imprisonment.
C. Definition of "Over the Age of Eighteen"
The Court held in Garrett v. Commonwealth" that, for
purposes of KRS section 532.080(3)(b),100 a person is "over the
age of eighteen from the first moment of the day on which his
eighteenth birthday falls .... ,101 The Court found unpersuasive
the argument that "over the age of eighteen" means at least
nineteen.'0 2
The Court did not share its reasoning, 03 even though the
phrase "over the age of eighteen" is arguably ambiguous when
compared with age requirements in other statutory enactments.
The legislature has, in other contexts, employed such language
as "being eighteen years old or more,"'' 4 "eighteen years of age
or over,"'0 5 and "age of eighteen years." 1 6 Additionally, at least
one court has reached an opposite conclusion. In Wilson v. Mid-
'Id.
, See note 95 supra.
675 S.W.2d I (Ky. 1984).
-- KRS § 532.080(3) (1985) provides in material part: "As used in this provision,
a previous felony conviction is a conviction of a felony in this state or conviction of a
crime in any other jurisdiction provided: ... (b) That the offender was over the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time the offense was committed .... .
"1 675 S.W.2d at 1.
102 Id.
-0' See id.
It4 KRS § 510.050(1) (1985) (second degree rape statute).
' KRS § 530.050(4) (1985) (nonsupport and flagrant nonsupport statute).
' KRS § 2.015 (1980) (age of majority in Kentucky).
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Continental Life Insurance Co.,'07 the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
interpreting an insurance policy, held that "over the age of 65
years" is "universally understood" to mean that a person is not
over sixty-five years of age until he or she reaches the sixty-sixth
year. 10
The Garrett Court's holding also raises questions about the
meaning of the PFO statute's second age requirement-that an
individual adjudicated a PFO be "more than twenty-one (21)
years of age.' ' 0 9 In Hayes v. Commonwealth,' 0 the Court held
that an individual can be convicted as a PFO so long as he is
twenty-one when he is convicted of a second felony, even though
he was not twenty-one at the time he committed the second
felony. The Hayes Court assumed that "more than twenty-one"
simply means twenty-one."' The precise issue of the meaning of
"more than twenty-one" was not before the Court, however,
and was not considered by it. In view of the Garrett Court's
interpretation of "over the age of eighteen," the legislature's
choice of different phraseology, in the same statute, regarding
the element "more than twenty-one" possibly signifies that "more
than twenty-one" means twenty-two.
D, Escape from Jail is an Offense Committed
While "Imprisoned"
In Damron v. Commonwealth,"2 the Kentucky Supreme Court
again construed "imprisonment" as used in KRS section
532.080(4). The statute provides:
For the purpose of determining whether a person has two (2)
or more previous felony convictions, two (2) or more convic-
tions of crime for which that person served concurrent or
101 14 P.2d 945 (Okla. 1932). Nevertheless, the court noted the typical treatment of
ambiguity in insurance contracts by saying, "If the policy of insurance is susceptible of
two constructions, that one is adopted which is most favorable to the insured." Id. at
947.
Id. at 946.
KRS § 532.080(3) (1985).
11 660 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1983).
" See id. at 6.
" 687 S.W.2d 138 (Ky. 1985). For a discussion of other aspects of Damron, see
supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
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uninterrupted consecutive terms of imprisonment shall be
deemed to be only one conviction, unless one (1) of the con-
victions was for an offense committed while that person was
imprisoned. " 3
Damron contended that a jail escape committed while await-
ing trial was not an offense committed while "imprisoned." He
urged the Court to interpret "imprisonment" as limited to cus-
tody by the Department of Corrections since only such custody
would expose him to a rehabilitative effort. 1 4 The Court rejected
Damron's argument, holding that "escape from jail is encom-
passed in the statute.""' 5
In reaching its decision the Court repudiated the commentary
to KRS section 532.080(4). The commentary states:
... When an individual has been convicted two times before
serving any time in prison, his convictions shall be considered
a single conviction for purposes of this section. This is another
effort to avoid the label of persistent felony offender for
persons who might be rehabilitated through an ordinary term
of imprisonment for the offense most recently committed." 6
The Court acknowledged that the PFO statute's commentary
emphasized treating as one offense multiple offenses resulting in
a single, uninterrupted course of rehabilitation." 7 Nevertheless,
the Court itself read legislative intent as indicating that "the
legislature intended to deal more harshly with persons who com-
mit crimes while incarcerated.""' The Damron Court's decision
does not overrule its earlier opinion in Combs v.
M KRS § 532.080(4) (1985) (emphasis added).
"' 687 S.W.2d at 140. Damron had three prior 1980 judgments of conviction from
Crittenden County, all of which ran concurrently, and two 1980 judgments of conviction
from Livingston County, both of which ran concurrently with the Crittenden County
judgments. All of the convictions related to crimes occurring in a six week period
commencing June 15, 1980. Id. at 142 (Liebson, J., dissenting).
M, Id. at 140.
116 Id. (quoting KRS § 532.080(4) commentary (1974)).
W 687 S.W.2d at 140. The Court disposed of the commentary as follows: "It is
plain that the commentary is centered on the defendant being exposed to rehabilitative
efforts. We regard the commentary as good advice but not necessarily all inclusive. It
is pertinent as far as it goes but does not contemplate the present situation." Id.
I's Id.
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Commonwealth'1 9 that "when an individual has been convicted
two times before being exposed to the institutional rehabilitation
efforts afforded by a term of imprisonment, the two convictions
shall count only as one in persistent felony offender proceed-
ings." 20 Nevertheless, Damron significantly enlarges the KRS
section 532.080(4) exception for offenses committed while im-
prisoned by construing that exception to include escape from
jail while awaiting trial. Justice Liebson dissented.' 2'
E. Prior Felony Conviction Must Be Obtained Prior to
Commission of Present Felony
The court of appeals held in Dillingham v. Commonwealth'2
that "KRS 532.080[11] requires that all prior felony convictions
used as a basis for enhancing a present felony conviction must
have been obtained prior to the date of the commission of the
present felony."' 2 4 Dillingham's conviction as a PFO was based
in part on a conviction obtained on February 15, 1980. However,
the principal offense was committed prior to that date, on Jan-
uary 1, 1980. The court held that the enhancement use of the
felony conviction obtained after the date of commission of the
underlying offense was impermissible.'2
On its face, KRS section 532.080 does not confine "previous
felony convictions" to convictions obtained prior to commission
of the principal offense. Indeed, subsections (2) and (3) provide
that:
(2)A persistent felony offender in the second-degree is a person
S.. who stands convicted of a felony after having been con-
victed of one (1) previous felony ....
"9 652 S.W.2d 859 (Ky. 1983).
'" Id. at 861. In contrast to Damron, the Court in Combs found support for its
decision in the official commentary: "The 1974 commentary to the criminal code makes
it plain that the intent of the persistent felony offender statute was to restrict its
application to persons who have been previously exposed to an institutional rehabilitative
effort .... " Id.
2I Justice Liebson cited Combs with approval arguing that the legislature clearly
did not intend temporary jail terms pending trial to constitute "imprisonment" within
KRS § 532.080(4). 687 S.W.2d at 142 (Liebson, J., dissenting).
2 684 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
I- KRS § 532.080 (1985).
124 684 S.W.2d at 309 (emphasis in original).
' Id.
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(3)A persistent felony offender in the first-degree is a person
... who stands convicted of a felony after having been con-
victed of two (2) or more felonies. 2 6
The statute thus allows the enhancement use of any felony
conviction obtained prior to the conviction for the present fe-
lony. Under Kentucky's former habitual criminal statute, there
also was no express requirement that the previous felony con-
victions have been obtained before commission of the principal
offense. 2 7 The former Kentucky Court of Appeals nevertheless
read such a requirement into the statute in White v.
Commonwealth'2 and Cobb v. Commonwealth.2 9 The court of
appeals in Dillingham determined that these decisions were based
on reasoning equally applicable to the present PFO statute: "We
have compared KRS 431.190 with the present statute, KRS
532.080, and find that the principles enumerated in White and
Cobb are consistent with KRS 532.080. ' '130
The court of appeals holding is also consistent with the PFO
statute's intent to "restrict application of the habitual offender
statute to persons who have been previously exposed to an
institutional rehabilitative effort.' 3' At the time that the prin-
': KRS § 532.080(2), (3) (emphasis added).
KRS § 431.190 (1962), repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 406, § 336 (Jan. 1, 1975),
defined and penalized the habitual criminal as follows:
Any person convicted a second time of felony shall be confined in the
penitentiary not less than double the time of the sentence under the first
conviction; if convicted a third time of felony, he shall be confined in the
penitentiary during his life. Judgment in such cases shall not be given for
the increased penalty unless the jury finds, from the record and other
competent evidence, the fact of former convictions for felony committed
by the prisoner, in or out of the state.
1 379 S.W.2d 448, 449 (Ky. 1964). The Court emphasized that the other convic-
tions must precede the principal offense because, as a matter of policy, only the prior
convictions will sufficiently warn the defendant to cease his activities. Id.
1- 101 S.W.2d 418, 420 (Ky. 1936). Boyd v. Commonwealth, 521 S.W.2d 84 (Ky.
1975) ("[T]his court in construing the Habitual Criminal Act has consistently held that
it is the commission of a second felony after conviction of a first felony and the
commission of a third felony after conviction of a second that is required to be
established .... " Id. at 84.). See Hardin v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1968)
(burden placed on state to directly prove the succession of the prior convictions).
684 S.W.2d at 309.
KRS § 532.080 commentary (1974).
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cipal offense was committed, Dillingham, not having been con-
victed of the previous felony, had not been exposed to any
attempted rehabilitation.1 32 Consequently, Dillingham had not
demonstrated the incapacity for rehabilitation ordinarily present
in a first degree PFO case. 133
IV. SENTENCING
A. Effect of Parole Revocation and Good Time Forfeiture on
Minimum Expiration Date
In Hobbs v. Commonwealth, 34 the defendant contended that
the circuit court erred in allowing his prior felony conviction to
be used for enhancement because his minimum sentence expi-
ration date was more than five years prior to the commission of
the principal offense. 3 5 While this case arises in the context of
a PFO conviction, it is significant for its interpretation of various
statutes relating to the effect of parole and "good time"' 36 on
sentence expiration.
Hobbs was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in 1971 and
received a sentence of four years with a maximum expiration
date of May 14, 1975. Upon his imprisonment on July 21, 1971,
the Corrections Cabinet determined that, according to a schedule
of good time awarded each prisoner, four years would result in
a minimum expiration date of June 1, 1974, if completely served.
On June 7, 1973, Hobbs was paroled for the first time. Subse-
quently, he violated the provisions of his parole, and was re-
turned to prison on October 1, 1974. He was paroled for the
second time on December 21, 1974, and received his final dis-
32 684 S.W.2d at 309.
'" See notes 114-16 supra and accompanying text.
690 S.W.2d 771 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
I' d. at 772. KRS § 532.080(2)(c)(3) (1985) requires a finding that the defendant:
"Was discharged from probation, parole, conditional discharge, conditional release, or
any other form of legal release on any of the previous felony convictions within five (5)
years prior to the date of commission of the felony for which he now stands convicted
" See KRS § 197.045(1) (1982). "Good time" refers to a credit or reduction in
sentence earned by a prisoner for good conduct. The credit may not exceed 10 days for
each month served and may be forfeited if the prisoner commits any offense or violates
the rules of the institution while imprisoned. Id.
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charge from parole on October 18, 1976. On March 11, 1980,
he committed the principal offense. 37
Hobbs argued that the original minimum expiration date of
his sentence, June 1, 1974, was the appropriate date from which
to calculate whether his previous conviction fell within the five
year limit of KRS section 532.080(2)(c)(3). His argument was
based on counting his parole time as service of the sentence. 38
The court of appeals rejected this contention, citing KRS section
439.344,139 which states: "The period of time spent on parole
shall not count as a part of the prisoner's maximum sentence
except in determining parolee's eligibility for a final discharge
from parole as set out in KRS 429.354."' 4 The court also relied
on KRS section 439.340(2),' 4' which provides: "[P]arole shall be
ordered only for the best interest of society and not as an award
of clemency, and it shall not be considered a reduction of
sentence or pardon."' 42
As an alternative argument, Hobbs submitted that he was
entitled to good time reduction of sentence as a matter of right. 43
The court of appeals rejected this argument on the basis of KRS
section 197.045(1), 144 which authorizes the forfeiture of good
time: "The [Corrections] cabinet shall have authority to forfeit
any good time previously earned by the prisoner, or to deny the
prisoner the right to earn good time in any amount, if during
the term [not time] of imprisonment a prisoner commits any
offense or violates the rules of the institution.' '1 45
In effect, the court held that offenders can be paroled beyond
their minimum expiration date and that parole revocation results
" 690 S.W.2d at 772.
1 Id.
"9 Id.
" KRS § 439.344 (1985). See also Stokes v. Howard, 450 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. 1970)
("The sole question on this appeal being whether a parole violator, who subsequently
committed and was convicted of other felonies, is entitled to credit for time spent out
on parole toward the completion of his sentences, the answer is that he is not.") Id. at
520 (citing KRS § 439.344).
"1 690 S.W.2d at 772.
"' KRS § 439.340(2) (1985).
690 S.W.2d at 772.
1I d.
14, KRS § 197.045(1) (1982).
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in loss of good time for a person on parole past the minimum
expiration date.'4
B. "Use" Must Be Personal Under KRS Section 533.060
KRS section 533.060(1) imposes an additional penalty upon
offenders using a firearm:
(1) When a person has been convicted of an offense or
has entered a plea of guilty to an offense classified as a Class
A, B, or C felony and the commission of such offense involved
the use of a weapon from which a shot or projectile may be
discharged that is readily capable of producing death or other
serious physical injury, such person shall not be eligible for
probation, shock probation or conditional discharge. 47
In Commonwealth v. Reed,148 the court of appeals addressed
the issue 'of whether the "use" required by the statute means
personal use. Reed and a co-defendant both pled guilty to charges
of first degree robbery. The co-defendant displayed a gun during
the offense, but Reed was unarmed. Based on these facts the
Commonwealth argued that both the co-defendant and Reed
should be denied probation pursuant to KRS section 533.060(1). 149
The circuit court disagreed 50 and the Commonwealth ap-
pealed.1
The court of appeals stated the issue as "whether [the co-
defendant's] use of the firearm should be imputed to the appellee
and, as a result, trigger the application of KRS section 533.060
to deny the appellee probation."'- 2 The court held that the term
"use" as contained in the statute is ambiguous. 53 In Haymon
"I See 690 S.W.2d at 772.
7 KRS § 533.060(l) (1985) (emphasis added).
M 680 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
141 Id. at 135.
1'0 The circuit court found that since Reed "was not in actual possession of the
firearm used in the robbery even though he acted in complicity with [the co-defendant],
KRS § 533.060(1) does not apply through KRS § 502.020." Id. at 135-36. KRS 502.020
provides that in certain situations one may be held liable for the acts of another.
Apparently, in the circuit court's opinion, none of the situations existed.
M 680 S.W.2d at 136.
152 Id.
5 Id.
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v. Commonwealth, 54 the Kentucky Supreme Court, recognizing
the ambiguity, interpreted "use" to the defendant's benefit by
holding that the defendant, who fled the scene of a burglary
with a stolen shotgun, had not committed an offense involving
the use of a weapon. 5- The court of appeals in Reed similarly
resolved the interpretive question before it:
[W]e find that the ambiguity contained in the statute-
whether a defendant is guilty of committing an offense involv-
ing the use of a weapon if his cocomplicitor, rather than
himself, personally used the weapon-is an ambiguity which
must be resolved in the appellee's favor. As we construe the
statute, we hold that the term "use" means "personal use,"
not vicarious usage. 5 6
The court of appeals additionally reasoned that a distinction
can be drawn between a complicity statute, which specifically
provides for criminal liability based on the conduct of another,
and an enhancement provision of a penalty statute, which does
not specifically create vicarious liability.17 The court of appeals
noted that "[o]ther courts have made a similar distinction and
have disallowed any attempt to create vicarious liability under
enhancement provisions of a penalty statute."' 58 The court's
decision is consistent with the majority rule in other jurisdic-
tions. 59 The Reed holding is also consistent with the mandate
of individualized sentencing implicit in the requirement of KRS
section 533.010(2) that: "Before imposition of a sentence of
imprisonment the court shall consider the possibility of proba-
tion ... [a]fter due consideration of the nature and circumstan-
657 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Ky. 1983).
' Id.
680 S.W.2d at 137.
'" Id.
"' Id.
See People v. Walker, 555 P.2d 306 (Cal. 1976) ("personal" use of gun required
in armed felony statutes); Earnest v. State, 351 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1977) ("knowing and
active" aid to one in possession of gun insufficient to activate armed felony statute);
State v. Thompson, 614 P.2d 970 (Idaho 1980) (strict construction of penal statutes
requires that only the defendant who used the gun be subject to statutory enhancements);
State v. Hicks, 589 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (defendant is subject to statute which
enhances the penalty for armed felonies only if in actual, physical possession of the
firearm).
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ces of the crime and the history, character and condition of the
defendant ."16
CONCLUSION
During the survey period the Kentucky Supreme Court and
Kentucky Court of Appeals looked to their own precedents and
those of other states, but did not hesitate to overrule existing
case law. The courts' interpretations of various provisions of
the Penal Code sometimes notably broadened, and sometimes
narrowed, prior interpretations of those provisions. Overall, the
cases surveyed show both significant changes and continued
steady evolution in Kentucky's criminal law.
- KRS § 533.010(2) (1985).
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